

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROUTING SLIP

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SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary

6/6/84

Date

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Executive Registry

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6 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Soviet R&D

1. I have underlined in this piece, "Can Soviet R&D Keep Up the Pace?", what seems to be two interesting compendiums of information on how Soviet science and technology works. You might look into their availability.

2. Also, The Wilson Center has scheduled on June 26 and 27 a two-day conference on the experience, current conditions and prospects of US-Soviet reciprocal exchange programs. See the last page of the attached flyer.



William J. Casey

Attachments:

The Wilson Center/June 1984 Reports  
The Wilson Center/Calendar June 1984

25X1

# THE WILSON CENTER / JUNE 1984 REPORTS



## JIMMY CARTER ON THE PRESIDENCY

"I want to say that I enjoyed being president. Even when I had my most disappointing days. . . I don't remember a single morning when I didn't look forward to getting to the Oval Office. I enjoyed the challenge of it—analyzing complicated issues, trying to put a plan into effect, answering a question, overcoming a difficulty or obstacle. . . . There were some bad times, perhaps the worst of all the day our rescue mission failed in the Iranian desert. . . . [But] I appreciated the opportunity to serve. In my judgment the presidency is not an unmanageable office."

Jimmy Carter came to The Wilson Center March 5, sharing his reflections on the presidency in an evening dialogue with an audience that included 10 members of the Center's Board of Trustees and its Wilson Council, as well as a number of those who served him. From his former White House staff came Lloyd Cutler, Stuart Eizenstat, and Jody Powell; representing his Cabinet were Robert Bergland, Harold Brown, and James Schlesinger. Mark Hatfield, the senior senator from Oregon and chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, presided.

Setting the stage for the former president's remarks were former Wilson Center fellows Jack Walker and William Leuchtenburg. According to Walker, a University of Michigan political scientist, increased political mobilization and involvement over the last 30 years have been at the expense of authority and effective leadership. The modern president's task is thus much more difficult than it once was. Leuchtenburg, the prize-winning FDR historian who teaches at Chapel Hill, wasn't so sure. Presidents, he found—and he quoted 11 of them between John Adams and Harry Truman—have perennially complained about the horrors of the job. The presidency has always been in a state of crisis, it seems. But maybe there is "something unique about the present situation."

Jimmy Carter didn't think so. "The condition of the modern presidency," he said, "is certainly no worse than the condition that has prevailed for almost 200 years." A contemporary president "routinely face problems that would have been considered great emergencies in the past." He said he had, however, thought about the inadequacies of the Constitution, and concluded that "it is almost a crippling mistake" that treaty ratification requires a two-thirds Senate vote. That would be fine to *override*, he said, but "only a third of the Senate should be required for ratification." Carter said also he favored a single six-year term for president. He noted that, besides making the changing of the guard less frequent, it would promote continuity

in the conduct of foreign policy because contenders for the presidency wouldn't need to "carve out" positions "almost diametrically opposed" to those of the incumbent. Challengers would then have one less reason not to go along with basic policies. Of the claim that a president ineligible for reelection would be a lame duck from his first day in office, Carter said: "I would be willing to take my chances on that." Congressional passage of the final stages of energy legislation, the Super Fund bill, and the Alaska Lands proposal was won, he recalled, *after* his November 1980 defeat.

Carter agreed with his former secretary of energy, James Schlesinger, that "a shrinkage in American margins of power over the last 15–20 years" had put "increasing responsibility upon the presidency." But he did not respond directly to Schlesinger's question: Is the president's traditional role adequate to respond quickly in a crisis? The former president said only that "there are some problems in the world that we simply cannot handle. A certain reticence or even timidity ought therefore to prevail on the president. . . . It has damaged our country to say that we are powerful enough to resolve any crisis when we really don't have that kind of power anymore."

Moreover, Carter said, "We haven't yet adequately learned that when we go into a foreign nation, put our arms around a leader, even a popular one, and then say this is our boy, it is almost a kiss of political death. . . . This happened to a substantial degree in Vietnam, and in Lebanon with Gemayel. I think it is going to happen or is already happening in El Salvador."

But President Reagan "seems to be saying that the United States is not the prisoner of severe limitations," said former LBJ speechwriter Harry McPherson. He even "conveys a certain insouciance about the presidency, and people not only do not mind, they seem to enjoy it."

Jimmy Carter agreed. "I don't know what makes popularity go up," he began his final remarks. "But one of the great things about President Reagan's personality is that he seems satisfied with the way the nation is doing. He gives the impression that he is pleased with his job, that he is not worried about a crisis. . . . Popularity has to do with the way you present yourself, and I must say I have great admiration for President Reagan because he does it so well."

A special booklet on the evening dialogue—*Jimmy Carter on the Presidency: A Wilson Center Conversation*—will be published this month.

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**CONSENSUS ON CENTRAL AMERICA:  
NOT EASY TO REACH**

U.S. policy in Central America was the subject of debate at The Wilson Center February 28 in an evening dialogue organized by the Center's Latin American and International Security Studies programs. The question before the house concerned the proper role (if any) of a U.S. military presence in the region. Former OAS ambassador Sol Linowitz, a member of the Wilson Council, moderated the exchange among Michael Barnes, the Maryland Democrat who chairs the House subcommittee on Western Hemisphere affairs; Stephen Bosworth, chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department; and George Melloan, deputy editor of the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page.

None of the panelists believed that *some* level of U.S. military assistance was necessarily inappropriate, but Michael Barnes, who led off the discussion, was reluctant to say how much. "We haven't even agreed on the questions of fact and purpose yet," he said, asserting that there is "near unanimity" among "respected Latin Americanists" that the Reagan administration "fundamentally misunderstands both Central America and U.S. interests there." Citing administration attempts to describe structurally similar elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua as, respectively, "the epitome" and "the perversion" of democracy. Barnes accused the administration of distorting the region's "uncomfortable realities" to win support for its policies.

Despite his feeling that administration talk about elections, human rights, and economic aid for El Salvador was "really designed to . . . help sustain its military policy," Barnes said he had "no problem in principle" with the current U.S. objective of defeating the guerillas there—or of encouraging a change of regime in Managua—if this could be achieved at "an acceptable cost." But, he claimed, the guerillas are in a "far superior position militarily" today, a quarter of a billion U.S. dollars and three years later, and the Sandinistas have shown they are "stronger than ever." U.S. policy, Barnes charged, "has had the *opposite* effect of what we intended. It's demonstrating our limitations, not our power."

Now "what makes sense is to do something different," he declared, "not to debate the level of resources that we're going to devote to a failed policy." We should be "pursuing political solutions to what are essentially political problems," said Barnes, who suggested specifically "letting regional powers take the lead in finding solutions."

Barnes, senior counselor to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, expressed disappointment that the group, led by Henry Kissinger, hadn't done more to "bring us together on the questions of how to approach the region." Rather, the commission "jumped from the assertion that we have vital interests there" (he said that was a "given") to the

conclusion that "we must do more of what the administration is already doing."

Stephen Bosworth, however, was pleased that consensus had begun to emerge on Central America. Americans, thanks in part to press coverage of the Kissinger Commission report, he said, have come to recognize that U.S. interests there "are sufficient to require some sort of involvement by our country in that region." They are also aware, he observed, that the area's enormous indigenous problems—poverty, obsolescent political institutions, growing income disparity and unemployment—have been exacerbated by external forces.

"I would be among the first to admit that if Cuba and the Soviet Union *did not exist*, . . . one would still find insurgencies in some of the Central American countries," Bosworth declared, but they wouldn't have achieved such "momentum and force," nor would they have constituted such a "severe threat" to both existing governments and long-standing U.S. reform programs. We have "something of an obligation," therefore, to supply enough aid for the people of the region to "defend themselves," he said.

Accepting the Kissinger Commission prescription that we "do more of the same" (as Barnes put it) does not necessarily mean that the prescription is false, Bosworth pointed out, nor is success likely without "sufficient resources" behind that policy. By the same token, he said, American efforts to help to build democratic institutions quickly in "less than ideal conditions" are unquestionably difficult, but hardly "miscalculated or wrong." In fact, said Bosworth, military aid and institution-building efforts, when coupled with economic assistance to "put a better Band-Aid on the economic wounds in the region" and provide "some hope of economic progress," ultimately make a purely military solution neither "feasible" nor "desirable."

George Melloan, winner of the Inter-American Press Association's *Daily Gleaner* Award for his series of editorials on U.S.-Latin American relations, said the United States needed both a military and a political strategy for the region, with the former supplied "to the extent necessary to win." As for consensus, Grenada, according to Melloan, "proved that if you succeed first, consensus comes later." That military action, he said, was in welcome contrast to the usual "syndrome of concern and doubt about American foreign policy."

"I don't think we have to apologize for our involvement in Central America," Melloan declared. If we haven't already done so, in fact, we should establish a "permanent installation" in Honduras to project our power, and help El Salvador "win this war" against the guerillas. "I don't advocate marching into Nicaragua," Melloan continued, "but we have to. . . stop the spread of what I have no doubt is a Marxist-Leninist takeover movement." The stability of Central America, he concluded, is dependent on our continued presence there.

## CAN SOVIET R&D KEEP UP THE PACE?

Bits and pieces of valuable new information about Soviet science and technology have emerged over the last 15 years as small numbers of Soviet scientists and engineers have emigrated to the West. Their accounts of life inside the Soviet scientific establishment were put together for the first time recently in two projects just completed. One, conducted by Harvard, was based on interviews with several hundred émigré researchers. The other, a companion project that concluded its work in a February 24-25 conference at the Center's Kennan Institute, was MIT's Eyewitness Seminar series. Ten of its 11 sessions brought a leading émigré scientist together with American specialists in his field.

"Our goal," said seminar codirector Loren Graham in his summary of the project, "was to define the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet science and technology and to try to explain [them] in terms of the intellectual, political, and social characteristics of the Soviet Union." According to Mark Kuchment, codirector with Graham and a research associate at Harvard's Russian Research Center, the group wanted "to close the gap" between the way the Soviet R&D community is described in the official literature on the subject and the way it *really* is, and also "to bridge the cultural gap" between U.S. and Soviet practitioners.

Graham, a professor of the history of science at MIT and a former Kennan Institute fellow, noted that most of the eyewitnesses thought Soviet elementary and high-school education superior to that of the United States. Some felt this held true at the university level as well, particularly in mathematics and physics, two subjects in which Russia's strength predates the 1917 revolution. In other areas of fundamental or theoretical research, as well, what Western specialists call the "blackboard rule" is indeed in effect. Graham confirmed: "Soviet science is likely to be strong in any area where the main tools of research are a blackboard and chalk, and weak in areas requiring material support, sophisticated instrumentation, the most modern computers, or close contact with industry."

Another source of strength for Soviet science and technology, according to Graham, is that Soviet society "worships science." And he found the Soviet government's emphasis on continuity of research no less important. Scientists in leading institutions there, unlike many of their colleagues here, "feel free to embark on long-term projects without fear that their budgets will be eliminated before they can complete their work." Furthermore, Soviet planners are apt to select a few high-priority areas of research, both military and nonmilitary, and then to pump money and personnel into them. So far the approach has paid off in computers and biotechnology.

Some of these advantages, however, cut both ways. While

continuity of research in a few concentrated areas, for example, may account for certain scientific advances, it also has a way of stifling innovation. Thus the Soviet eyewitnesses, accustomed to what MIT Research Associate Paul Josephson called "a follow-the-leader approach" to taking on research, were most surprised by their discovery that American R&D seemed to be driven by the pursuit of scientific issues that were "hot." The Americans found the Soviet system much less nimble. Scientific institutions are rarely eliminated. The bureaucracy is "often afraid of innovation," Graham explained, because innovation "undermines careers and leads to unsettling changes."

A further impediment to innovation, according to Graham, is the Soviet economic system, which provides no incentive for putting research results into production. As a result, the Soviet researcher seems content to publish his findings as ends in themselves. Thereafter, he often loses interest in the topic. His American counterpart, meanwhile, is wasting no time in either taking the next step in the research process or beginning to figure out how to apply his findings commercially.

"Ideology and the need for international competition *really* do impel [the Soviets] to continue to try to operate a world-class scientific establishment," Harley Balzer, a Georgetown University historian, concluded, but "if you did a cost-benefit analysis, you might well close it down."

Plaguing Soviet science and technology even more directly is the Soviet supply and distribution system. Émigrés who were interviewed said they waged an unending battle to obtain supplies, not just sophisticated equipment, but nuts, bolts, paper, simple reagents. It was not unusual, they said, to halt their research for several weeks just to get the materials they needed to carry on.

They reported that lines of scientific communication, too, were inadequate. Because Soviet scientific journals are slow to pick up Western discoveries and are censored, researchers in the USSR are always playing catch up with their colleagues in the West. In addition, said Bruce Parrott, professor of Soviet studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the editorial boards of international scientific journals—so-called invisible colleges—include few Russians. Again, they must go without the exchange of information that is one of the hallmarks of Western scientific publication.

Perhaps most startling in this respect was Graham's observation that "Western scientists visiting the Soviet Union often find that a Soviet scientist working on a given topic in one institute does not know of the existence of another Soviet scientist working on the same topic in another institute in the same city. The foreigners often play the role of bringing the two researchers together."

A final strike against the Soviet scientific establishment is its growing anti-Semitism, according to a number of the émigrés, most of whom are Jewish. Graham predicted damage to the

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Soviet Union's strongest academic subjects, math and physics, from the exclusion of Jews, but noted that "the depth of talent in these fields is so great that the damage can probably be tolerated by the Soviet authorities."

At least two conference participants were reluctant to generalize from the eyewitness accounts. One, Linda Lubrano, an American University Soviet-studies professor, termed the results of the interviews "description more than explanation." Are we looking at Soviet science or the international dimensions of science? she asked. Do the interviewees, all top-ranking Soviet scientists, represent rank-and-file scientists? Do they represent the émigré scientific community or the Soviet scientific community? Do the findings show that Soviet scientists hold the views of Soviet society at large?

Interpreting the results is equally difficult without "good history," insisted Mark Adams, professor of the history and sociology of science at the University of Pennsylvania. "Policy studies *must* be historical, because that's where other sets of options were decided on by other decision makers. . . and we know the consequences," he said. "How are we going to understand how they function this year if we don't know how they developed?" A large part of the answer, Adams suggested, lies in an examination of the contradiction embodied by Soviet "bureaucratic science"—the "inert" and regressive management of what is *by definition* both creative and progressive.

That bureaucracy—and Soviet society as a whole—will ultimately determine how quickly and successfully new computer technologies can be absorbed in the USSR, said Graham. While the Western world is becoming increasingly aware "that the most efficient use of computers for a great range of applications is based on decentralized systems," the Soviet leadership, for political reasons, can't allow that. A microcomputer or a word processor that is hooked up to a printer and issued the proper commands, after all, is a "potential printing press," he said. "Anyone who remembers how Soviet dissidents of the late sixties used to spend days painfully typing *samizdat* documents on typewriters stuffed with five or six carbon copies will understand the significance of the new technology."

Thus, the Soviets are likely to continue the requirement that computers, like photocopiers, be "institutionally housed and controlled," predicted Graham, who was quick to point out that computers aren't about to "undermine or destroy the Soviet system." But, he said, the Soviets will "pay a stiff price" for eschewing entrepreneurship, free access to information, and private ownership of technology, all of which make a culture receptive to computers and enable their use to spread. "The evidence so far seems to indicate that a wide-open, chaotic, competitive marketplace with a staggering variety of contenders is the best environment for producing ingenious computer programs," Graham noted. "The Soviet Union could not dupli-

cate this environment without contradicting its most cherished economic principle, the elimination of private enterprise."

The policy implications of all this, Graham cautioned, are *not* that we should sell the Soviet Union short: When it comes to science and technology, the Soviets may not be "winners," but they're never far behind in a race that has no winners. We should rather "encourage the use of computers in our civilian economy," a sphere in which, according to Graham, "time is on the side of the West."

We must begin, he said, by "restraining the military technology [on both sides] that can so easily destroy us all, and on which the Soviet Union competes rather well." Then, Graham concluded, "the new civilian technology that is now penetrating to the lowest levels of Western societies, and on which the Soviet Union competes badly, will give the Western nations real advantages in modernizing and improving their societies."

## THE WILSON CENTER / CALENDAR

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SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDING 1000 JEFFERSON DRIVE SW WASHINGTON DC 20560

202 357 2115

### JUNE 1984

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Monday, June 4                      Workshop\*

"Cinema and Social Change in the Developing World: Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Asia"

Pat Aufderheide, freelance film critic and contributing editor, In These Times  
Mbye Cham, Assistant Professor of African Studies, Howard University  
Chidananda Dasgupta, Fellow, The Wilson Center; film critic, New Delhi  
Luis Francia, poet, writer, critic, and film editor, Bridge Quarterly

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Tuesday, June 5                      Noon Discussion

"South Africa and Its Neighbors: Beyond Destabilization"

Robert Jaster, writer on southern African affairs; former Fellow, The Wilson Center

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Colloquium, 4pm to 6pm

"Public-Private Interests: Entrepreneurs and the State in 20th Century Mexico"

Roderic Ai Camp, Fellow, The Wilson Center; Professor of History, Pella College  
Commentators: Aziz Hamzaoui, international consultant, Washington, D.C.;  
former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Tunisia; Richard Nuccio,  
Director, Latin American Program, Roosevelt Center for Policy Studies

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Wednesday, June 6                      Noon Discussion

"Foreign Trade: The Great Soviet Statistical Trap"

Igor Birman, Editor, Russia magazine

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Colloquium, 4pm to 6pm

"Was There a German Question in Tsarist Russia?"

Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Kennan Institute Short-term Grantee; historian in  
Russian and German political thought, Bonn  
Commentator: Jeremy Azrael, Council Member, Policy Planning Council,  
U.S. Department of State

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Thursday, June 7

Noon Discussion

"John Foster Dulles: The Man and the Myth"

Eleanor Lansing Dulles, retired diplomat and educator, Washington, D.C.

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Colloquium, 4pm to 6pm

"Closing the Gap: Fraternity in the Cultural History of the French Revolution"

Robert Emmet Kennedy, Jr., Professor of European History, George Washington University; former Fellow, The Wilson Center

Commentators: Elizabeth Eisenstein, Alice Freeman Palmer Professor of History, University of Michigan; Robert Palmer, Emeritus Professor of History, Yale University

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Friday, June 8

Noon Discussion

"Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management"

Scott Sagan, Research Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University

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Tuesday, June 12

Noon Discussion

"An MBFR Agreement--Now or Never"

Jonathan Dean, Resident Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former U.S. Representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Reduction Negotiations, Vienna (the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks)

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Wednesday, June 13

Noon Discussion

Introducing three new guest scholars of The Wilson Center:

Jan Chowaniec, specialist in international economic affairs, New York.

"The Realities and Dilemmas in Polish-Soviet Economic Relations--What Lies Ahead?"

Kimindo Kusaka, Japan. Director, Long-term Credit Bank, Tokyo.

"Industrialization and Its Cultural Ramifications in 20th-Century America"

Vladimir Paperny, free-lance researcher, Santa Monica; former Senior Research Associate, Department of Sociology, Research Institute for the Theory and History of Architecture, Moscow. "Soviet Architecture as an Indicator of Cultural Processes"

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Thursday, June 14

Poetry Reading/Discussion, 4pm to 6pm

"Dreams of a Waking Colossus: Contemporary Indian Poetry in English"

Gieve Gustad Patel, Fellow, The Wilson Center; physician and playwright, Bombay

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Monday, June 18

Evening Dialogue\*

"Prison Industries: One Way Out of the Correctional Quagmire?"

Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States  
Norman A. Carlson, Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons  
Gail S. Funke, Research Associate, Institute of Economic and Policy Studies  
Aaron Jaffe, Illinois State Representative

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Tuesday, June 19

Noon Discussion

Introducing one new fellow and two new guest scholars of The Wilson Center:  
Robert A. Hill, Jamaica. Assistant Professor of History, University of California, Los Angeles. "Marcus Garvey and the Black International: A Centennial Biography"  
Reinhard Meier, Switzerland. Political correspondent, Neue Zürcher Zeitung.  
"The Current Relevance of the German Question and Its Future Prospects"  
Fernando Padilla, Director and Associate Professor of Chicano Studies, Washington State University. "The Constitutional Rights of Minorities"

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Wednesday, June 20

Conference\*

"Japanese and American Responses to an Unknown Future"

Cosponsored by the National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan,  
and the East Asia Program of The Wilson Center

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Friday, June 22

Noon Discussion

Introducing two new guest scholars of the Wilson Center:  
Saad Eddin-Hamdy Mortada, Ambassador of Egypt to Israel.  
"Egyptian-Israeli Relations and Problems after the Peace"  
Shirley Washington, Assistant Professor of Government, Wheaton College.  
"Portugal and Africa since 1974"

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Monday, June 25

Noon Discussion

"The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970"

Alistair Horne, independent writer, London; former Fellow, The Wilson Center

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Colloquium, 4pm to 6pm

"The Rise of the American Regulatory State, 1910-1940"

Elizabeth Sanders, Fellow, The Wilson Center; Associate Professor  
of Political Science, New School for Social Research, New York

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Tuesday-Wednesday, June 26-27      Conference\*

"U.S.-Soviet Exchanges"

This conference will seek to assess the experience, current condition, and prospects of existing U.S.-Soviet reciprocal exchange programs that involve academic, professional, technical, and administrative specialists.

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Thursday-Friday, June 28-29      Conference\*

"The Evolution of American Environmental Politics"

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\*by invitation

Seating is limited and must be on a first-come, first-served basis.

It is suggested that events be confirmed on the day of the event by telephoning Louise Platt or Cynthia Ely, 357-2115.